Terrorism Review

19 January 1984
Page Denied
### Terrorism Review
19 January 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Perspective: Terrorism Becoming More Lethal</td>
<td>Robin Schreiber, OGI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Highlights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>The Sarajevo Winter Olympics: Prospects for a Terrorist Incident</td>
<td>Dave Cariens, Beth Seeger, OGI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Spain: Terrorist Resurgence</td>
<td>Colin Winston, EURA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Statistical Overview</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Chronology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy Chief, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues.*
Terrorism
Review

19 January 1984

Perspective

Terrorism Becoming More Lethal

The most ominous development in terrorism during the past year was the increase
in state support of terrorist activity. Paralleling this growth was a probably related
increase in the lethality of terrorist attacks. Middle Eastern terrorists did the most
damage, capping the year with the spectacular bombing in October of the US and
French MNF Headquarters in Beirut:

- The 18 April bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut, the 23 October bombing of
the US and French MNF Headquarters facilities, and the multiple bombings at
US, French, and local government facilities in Kuwait were carried out by
radical Shias of different nationalities. More significantly, however, these
attacks almost certainly were Iranian and/or Syrian instigated and supported,
and that support may have been the key to their effective implementation.

- A decided step-up in activity by radical Palestinian Abu Nidal’s Black June
operatives, particularly the targeting of Jordanian diplomatic personnel abroad,
evidently was in retaliation for Amman’s refusal to free from imprisonment
several Black June members. The Abu Nidal group now operates out of
Damascus and acts with Syrian financial and material support, a factor that may
well give Black June a new and more potent vitality.

Access to the resources of sovereign governments greatly enhances terrorist
groups’ capabilities to plan, organize, and carry out their operations. In the Middle
East, increased access to the financial, material, and manpower resources of Iran
and Syria, for example, supplemented by the rabid anti-Americanism that
currently permeates the region and the ready availability of individuals willing to
die for their religious or secular ideals make for a particularly lethal combination.
Moreover, governments trying to devise counterterrorism programs against state-
sponsored terrorism are faced with a very different set of problems.

The accompanying chart also points out that while the Middle East is the
dominant locale for world-class terrorism, that region holds no monopoly on
violence:
In France, the Carlos group came to life just as the year ended. The group claimed credit for two New Year's Eve bombings—one in the Marseilles railroad station and another on a train en route to Paris from Marseilles—asserting that the bombings were in retaliation for French attacks against Shiite terrorist bases near Baalabakk in Lebanon.

In Spain, Basque separatists became increasingly active in 1983 and their terrorist operations spilled over into France as Spanish police pursued Basque activists who had sought refuge there. The terrorist acts of the Fatherland and Liberty Group (ETA) were supplemented by those of Iraultza. Attacks by Iraultza appeared to be heavily weighted against US interests.

The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru maintained a very high level of activity throughout the year, but its ultimate impact was limited by its failure to achieve its stated goal—to interrupt the November elections.

Some groups remained mercifully quiet—though we find only slight consolation here. While some no doubt found their efforts stymied by actions of local security, others may simply be regrouping, rebuilding damaged capabilities, or waiting for the propitious moment to resume operations:

Armenian terrorists, very active during the middle months of 1983, were quiet during the waning months of the year. The leftist ASALA group is in the process of reorganizing while members of the rightist group, JCAG, may be awaiting the conclusion of trials of some of their members before resuming active operations. Little if any comfort can be taken from their current inactivity—a resumption of attacks against Turks can be expected.

Apart from Black June, most Palestinian terrorist groups remained relatively inactive throughout the year. They were wrapped up in their own internecine struggles and, in the case of the more moderate Fatah, continued to adhere to Arafat's longstanding ban on terrorism.

What can we conclude from one year's tally of terrorist group activity?

That terrorism does not occur in a vacuum, that the political and social environment may provide clues to the where and why of heightened terrorism but are insufficient to clear our cloudy crystal ball.

That terrorism is a continuously evolving phenomenon, with new motivations, new groups, new locales, and new techniques surfacing on an unpredictable schedule.

That those who plan counterterrorism programs must try to be as imaginative as terrorists are in devising new methods to counter the new techniques that surely will surface.
### Activity and Impact of Terrorism, 1983

#### Legend

- **Transnational Groups**
- **Nearby***
- **Heavy***
- **Moderate***
- **Light***
- **Impact on target***
- **Severe***
- **Moderate***
- **Nighttime***
- **Absence of symbol indicates no information/no impact.***

#### Transnational Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Secret Army for Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)</td>
<td>● ● ●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junta Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAU)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black June Organization (BIO) (Palestinian)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (PFLP-SC)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian National Congress (ANC) (South Africa)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Revolutionary Union (Peoples Armed Forces of Colombia) (FARC) (Colombia)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Revolutionary Union (Cinchos/NEFEO) (Honduras)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Revolutionary Forces (Lettuce Zetas) (Honduras)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th of April Movement (M-19) (Columbia)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Colombia)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Flag (Iran)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sealand Liberation (SL) (Peru)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR (China)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Sponsors</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### European Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) (UK)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (IRE)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA and GRAPO (Spain)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP-35 (France)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Directe (France)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Brigade (BR, Autonomous (Italy)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Army Faction (RAF) (West Germany)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Cells (RE) (West Germany)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Revolutionary People's Struggle (EPL) (ELN) (Colombia) | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |

Note: This chart is part of a larger series. The judgments - while not reflective of specific intelligence systems - may vary by region and should be reviewed in conjunction with appropriate system output.
Highlights

**Alert List**

**Lebanon: New Trend in Terrorism.** Terrorists in Beirut may be putting more emphasis on killing selected individuals, a Lebanese political group is to begin recruiting people—principally Druze—to kill US and French officials. The victims are to be identified by their “Western appearance” and their vehicles’ diplomatic license plates. Care reportedly is to be taken to avoid injuring Lebanese citizens. Meanwhile, terrorist groups in Beirut have been trying to obtain, or have succeeded in acquiring, silenced weapons for use in assassinations. On 3 January, a French Embassy employee was wounded by a lone gunman using a silenced weapon. About two weeks earlier in the same area of Beirut a US serviceman was wounded by a sniper.

As precautions against car bombs are improved, terrorists probably view attacks against single individuals as one of several alternatives. Even if most of Lebanon’s factions were to agree to a cease-fire, various radical elements—particularly the Iranians—would still pose a major terrorist threat. Terrorist groups would be particularly alert for any sign that a cease-fire had led MNF forces to relax security.

**Syria: Encouraging Terrorist Activity Against Jordanian Targets.** Libya—and possibly Syria—is encouraging increased terrorist activity by groups under its direction against targets in Jordan. These include the Muslim Brotherhood, foreign embassies, moderate PLO officials, and Jordanian interests. Attacks may coincide with PLO chief Arafat’s anticipated visit to Amman this weekend. In this connection, a 12-pound bomb was discovered and defused last week outside the Islamic Center in Irbid, Jordan. The timing device on the bomb was similar to others fabricated and shipped by the Syrian Ba’th Party to Syrian-controlled groups in Jordan. Saiqa, Syria’s surrogate group in the PLO, recently has been planning attacks in Irbid and in the Jordan River valley against the Syrian opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood.
Key Indicators

France: Trial of ASALA Members May Provoke Violence. The trial of four Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) members which begins on 24 January may provoke terrorist violence. The individuals are accused of the September 1981 takeover of the Turkish Embassy in Paris during which a security guard was killed, a Turkish diplomat seriously wounded, and 51 persons held hostage for 15 hours before the group surrendered to French police. The trial will last one week and is expected to prompt protest demonstrations and threats from the large Armenian community in Paris. In view of ASALA's past retaliatory attacks against governments imprisoning ASALA members, the French Government anticipates violence aimed at intimidating the courts into releasing the Armenian suspects. In a September 1981 press conference, ASALA leader Hagop Hagopian threatened the French Government for reneging on promises to grant political asylum to the four ASALA members. Despite the disruption of ASALA's infrastructure by French police following the July 1983 Orly airport bombing, we believe ASALA still retains sufficient capability to conduct terrorist violence—especially bombings—in Paris and may attack French interests if its members are convicted.
Lebanon: Possible Mockup of Marine Position for Terrorist Training. At the site near An-Nassariyah in the Bekaa Valley, what appears to be a helicopter landing pad—similar to the one in the Marine compound at the Beirut airport—was constructed shortly after the helicopter pad was added to the US Marine compound in Beirut. The pad is approximately the same distance from a nearby road as the Marine pad is from the Beirut airport road. Terrorists often use mockups to rehearse operations, and the landing pad—which is near a suspected terrorist camp—could serve as a landmark for an aerial attack. There have been several reports in recent weeks of Iranian or Shia extremist plans to attack the MNF using helicopters or light planes. It should be noted, however, that the suspected terrorist camp is close to Syrian positions in the An-Nassariyah area, and the helipad could be intended for conventional, not terrorist, use; it could be used for the transport of supplies and personnel.

Significant Developments

West Germany: Terrorist Trial Postponed. The West German Government has postponed indefinitely the upcoming trial of Gabriele Kroecher-Tiedemann, one of the terrorists involved in the 1975 attack on the OPEC oil ministers in Vienna, which was led by Carlos. She is currently in jail in Switzerland, after having been convicted of other terrorist crimes, and the postponement may reflect extradition problems. However, in a letter last fall to the West German Embassy in Jidda, Carlos threatened bomb attacks in West Germany if Kroecher-Tiedemann is brought from Switzerland to stand trial. West German authorities have denied that they are bowing to blackmail.
Spain: Basque Terrorist Group Targets Socialists. The Anticapitalist Autonomous Commandos (CAA)—an anarchist offshoot of the Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)—announced on 12 January that the Socialist Party of Spain would be its main target for future terrorist attacks. We suspect CAA’s targeting of the Socialist Party is linked to Basque separatists’ belief that the Spanish Government is involved in a series of attacks against ETA members living in France (see following item). CAA previously espoused a violent antibusiness, anti-imperialist policy and frequently targeted businesses in the Basque region experiencing labor difficulties. During 1983, CAA’s repertoire widened to include arson, kidnapings, bombings, and machinegun attacks on Spanish National Police. The last attack by CAA—the 28 May 1983 midday assassination of two Spanish Civil Guardsmen in a crowded post office in Pamplona—indicated a new trend toward indiscriminate violence by the group. We believe the CAA warning poses a serious threat to Socialist Party members and facilities.

Spain: Counterterrorist Killings Spark Threats of Reprisals. The killing of well-known Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) militant Miguel Antonio Giokoetxea on 28 December in the French Basque country was the second such assassination in nine days by a new organization known as the Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL). GAL has criticized the lack of French cooperation in the struggle against ETA terrorists. The two killings are the latest incidents in a campaign that began in mid-October with the disappearance of two alleged ETA members in Bayonne, France. Basque groups—along with elements of the Spanish press—are charging the GAL is a hit squad organized, or at least assisted, by the Spanish police, who are conducting a “dirty war” against ETA members who have sought refuge in France. Basque groups have threatened to retaliate with more violence in Spain while GAL has promised additional reprisals in France, setting the stage for a spiral of violence in both countries. Large demonstrations of Basques protesting the killings have already led to clashes with police on both sides of the border.

Kuwait: Possible Acquittal of Bombing Suspects. The prosecutor’s office in Kuwait has decided not to try 19 of the 21 suspects held for the bombing of the US Embassy and other facilities on 12 December. The prosecutor contends that a solid case cannot be made against the suspects whose confessions reportedly were extracted under torture, but the most likely explanation is that Kuwait is trying to placate Iran, which is said to have threatened to kill 10 members of the Kuwaiti ruling family for each suspect executed. Security officials, who were proud of their swift apprehension of the suspects, are bitter about the decision. If the prosecutor’s decision stands, failure to try the suspects probably will further deepen tensions in Kuwait between the Sunni and Shia communities and damage morale in the security services.
Costa Rica: Formation of Antiterrorist Unit. The government is formulating plans to establish a 200-man antiterrorist unit to be based in San Jose. Communications equipment, already purchased, will enable the new unit to communicate with all elements of the Civil and Rural Guard, including Coast Guard vessels and aircraft. A major problem could be the government’s inability to rapidly deploy the unit to the scene of a terrorist incident because the military has only six aircraft and limited wheeled vehicles in its inventory.
Page Denied
The Sarajevo Winter Olympics: Prospects for a Terrorist Incident

We have no solid evidence that terrorists are planning an incident at the Winter Olympics (8-19 February), but a number of terrorist groups might well be interested in exploiting the games for publicity purposes. We believe that—should violence occur—it probably would be at the hands of one of the various radical Yugoslav emigre organizations.

The Yugoslav security services have for years targeted the emigres and neutralized much of the terrorist activity planned within Yugoslavia and against its foreign missions. With the Olympics, however, Yugoslav authorities will be confronted with an unprecedented number of foreign visitors; the resources of their security services will be strained to the limit. It will be difficult to adequately screen everyone coming into the country, even with the assistance of the West German Government.

The Emigre Threat
Terrorism is not new to the Balkans. Indeed, throughout the 20th century a variety of terrorists have left a bloody trail, the most infamous incident being the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne in 1914—in Sarajevo—which precipitated World War I.

Post–World War II Yugoslavia has had to cope with terrorist threats from several emigre quarters. The government has been assisted by the fact that bitter ethnic hatreds and political differences have prevented these groups from mounting a united opposition. Even within groups of the same nationality there are sharp divisions on goals and tactics. Nevertheless, the strong dedication to “a cause” has produced a number of successes, ranging from the headline-grabbing murders of Yugoslav diplomats or blowing up of a Yugoslav airliner to the more mundane distribution of anti-Titoist leaflets inside Yugoslavia.

There are three main groups of emigres whom Yugoslav officials are monitoring closely—the Croats, the Albanians, and the Serbs.

The Croats. The group most likely to attempt to disrupt the Olympics would be one of the Croatian extremist organizations. We have no solid evidence that a terrorist operation is planned, but we believe an incident is possible. Croatian emigres have demonstrated a capability to carry out terrorist attacks both inside and outside Yugoslavia. These groups are well aware of the historical significance of Sarajevo and would like nothing better than to embarrass the post-Tito regime. The Croatian extremists are dedicated to the destruction of the Yugoslav state and the creation of an independent Croatia. There are between 3,000 and 5,000 Croatian emigres worldwide—mainly in Germany—who belong to groups advocating violence.

If there is an incident at the Olympics, it is likely to originate with one of four emigre organizations: the Croatian National Committee, the Croatian National Resistance, the Croatian Liberation Movement, or the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood. A terrorist attack against any Yugoslav installation, either inside or outside the country, at the time of the Olympics would hold a great deal of appeal for the Croats because:

• It would gain publicity for the Croatian cause.
• It would avenge the murders of Croatian emigre activists believed to have been carried out by Yugoslav intelligence.
• Bosnia-Hercegovina, the site of the Winter Olympics, is a region claimed for Croatia by the emigres.
• It could jeopardize tourism and thereby deal an economic blow to Yugoslavia's already troubled economy.
The Albanians. A second, highly volatile group of emigres are the ethnic Albanians from the Yugoslav autonomous province of Kosovo. Although they are less numerous and not as well organized as the Croats, they have both the motive and some capability to attempt to foment terrorism. They also funnel aid to Albanians still in Kosovo and could utilize them to carry out a terrorist strike. Albania has trained Yugoslav Albanians in subversive activity. Following that training, the Albanians reportedly were sent back to Yugoslavia to carry out terrorist activity.

In postwar Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Albanians were subjected to harsh discrimination by the Serbs and their national expression and aspirations were brutally suppressed. Pent-up frustrations following years of abuse burst into riots in late 1968, and sporadic disturbances have continued since that time. Officials in Belgrade have pointed an accusing finger at both Tirana and emigre circles in the West. Meddling from Tirana appears to have been more of propaganda activity, rather than supplying money and/or arms.

In the more violent emigres in the West, however, may be a different story. We lack information on their organization and their specific goals, although they are reported to supply money, and possibly weapons, to Albanians in Kosovo.

The Serbs. Of the three major Yugoslav emigre groups, we believe the Serbs are the least likely to plan or carry out a terrorist attack.

The majority of Serb emigres oppose the Communists and want to reestablish Serb dominance in Yugoslavia. Available evidence indicates the Serbs are not well organized and not as prone to violence as either the Croats or Albanians. There are, however, individual Serbs who are willing to use violence against Yugoslav installations abroad. If the Serbs were to be responsible for a terrorist attack, it most likely would be perpetrated by the Serbian Youth Movement for Freedom or the Serbian Western Guard.

The Nonemigre Threat
Other terrorists such as the Armenians or radical pro-Iranians might seize the opportunity of the Olympics to strike. Because these groups have no apparent axe to grind with Belgrade, their targets probably would be foreign nationals at the Olympics, or possibly diplomatic missions in Belgrade.

The Armenians. One Armenian terrorist group—the rightwing Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)—murdered the Turkish Ambassador to Yugoslavia in March 1983. The JCAG and the Marxist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) seek revenge for the genocide of Armenians at the hands of the Turks in 1915 and the union of all Armenians into an independent state. Both groups have systematically carried out a series of bombings and murders against Turkish targets since 1975. We suspect JCAG—based on its earlier successful attack in Yugoslavia—is capable of conducting attacks during the Olympic games. ASALA, in our view, lacks a support apparat in Yugoslavia, and its operations have been disrupted by a bitter internal dispute over the organization’s use of indiscriminate violence.

The Iranians. Although we have no evidence of Iranian plans for terrorist attacks in Yugoslavia, Iranian-sponsored terrorism cannot be ruled out. Possible targets could include US participants. Iraq will not be represented at the games.

High-level Bosnian officials have told Western diplomats privately that they are worried Tehran might send a “hit team” to Sarajevo in reaction to the trial and sentencing of 12 Muslim activists in Sarajevo last summer. It is possible that the Iranians already have assets inside Yugoslavia who could assist, or even carry out, a terrorist attack. Yugoslav Muslims have made pilgrimages to Iran where they appear to have been indoctrinated with Khomeini-style Muslim fundamentalism. Muslim agitation has also prompted Belgrade to deport several Iranian student troublemakers.
Palestinians. We believe that Palestinian terrorism, although possible, is unlikely to occur in Yugoslavia. Belgrade recognizes the PLO and is a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause. In return for its backing of the Palestinian cause, Belgrade apparently has been promised that no Palestinian terrorist act will take place on Yugoslav soil. While non-PLO radical Palestinians such as Abu Nidal or Abu Ibrahim might not honor such an agreement, the absence of an Israeli team at the Winter Games removes what would otherwise be a prime target.

Libyans. Libyan-sponsored terrorism also does not appear likely. Relations between Belgrade and Tripoli are good, and Libya would want to avoid embarrassing Yugoslavs or damaging their bilateral relations. Yugoslavia is engaged in a number of major construction projects in Libya, and the Yugoslavs train Libyan technicians and pilots.

Yugoslav Preparations. Yugoslav security has worked hard for two and a half years to prevent a terrorist incident at the Olympics. Nevertheless the task of guaranteeing the security of the Olympic spectators and participants is a large and difficult one and the possibility exists that a terrorist could penetrate the country’s security.

Security plans and preparations for the games have been centralized under the “Sarajevo Organizing Committee for Olympic Security,” headed by Tomislav Juric. The committee has full responsibility for Olympic accreditation, VIP security, and overall physical security. Moreover, the Yugoslav intelligence service has for decades pursued an intensive antiterrorist program at home and abroad and has successfully used a variety of techniques to defuse the terrorist threat posed by the emigres.

Most recently, with an eye toward the Olympics, the Yugoslavs have engaged in a series of high-level consultations with a variety of Western countries to monitor and neutralize the emigre threat, as well as to improve security. The West German Government has agreed to cooperate with Yugoslav security personnel in screening airport arrivals in Sarajevo and other...
For over 20 years the Spanish Government has been locked in combat with ETA, the Basque terrorist organization. The Spanish Socialists' election victory in October 1982 spurred speculation that the new government—many of whose members sympathized with ETA when it was fighting Franco's dictatorship—might cut a deal with the terrorists. During his first months in office, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez in fact did seek indirect negotiations with the terrorists, but ETA refused even temporarily to lay down its arms. Recently, Madrid has adopted a much tougher antiterrorist line, and ETA has reaffirmed its devotion to violence by unleashing a new wave of murders and kidnapings. As a result, the Basque problem has returned to the center of Spanish politics, and the eradication of ETA has become perhaps the greatest challenge facing the Gonzalez administration.

The Terrorist Offensive
ETA's current offensive began last summer after the collapse of the so-called peace table negotiations among HB (Popular Unity, ETA's political front), the PNV, and Madrid. According to an official of the Basque Regional Government, ETA's leadership—concerned by a lack of concrete results and a decline in morale—came under pressure from the ranks to reassert the organization's presence in the Basque Country by stepping up terrorist actions. HB launched the first phase of the offensive, probably at the instigation of ETA-M. Throughout Euzkadi (the Basque region), HB militants burned Spanish flags and verbally and physically assaulted the representatives of the central government in the region. The "war of the flags" significantly raised political tensions in the Basque provinces and irritated the military, which is particularly sensitive to what it perceives as threats to either the reality or the symbols of national unity.

The Status of ETA
The Basque terrorist organization ETA has spawned a number of factions since the early 1970s, the most important being the military (ETA-M) and political-military (ETA-PM) wings. Press reports credit the dominant military faction with between 300 and 600 full-time members, while ETA-PM is alleged to possess from as few as a dozen to no more than 100 full-time terrorists. There is, in our view, little doubt that the prestige, influence, and size of all ETA factions is declining. A top Spanish police official claims that ETA has lost two-thirds of its core members over the past three years and is currently performing at the limit of its capabilities. We believe that this decline is above all due to reduced backing from the Basque population, which has undermined ETA's recruitment and increased the organization's logistic and operational difficulties. Nonetheless, ETA still retains several important strengths. The terrorists continue to enjoy a safehaven in southern France, and counterterrorist cooperation between Madrid and Paris remains minimal. But, above all, ETA still profits from its image as the only diehard defender of Basque independence. While the Basque population as a whole is coming to view an independent Basque state as an unrealistic goal, the largely Basque-speaking inhabitants of the isolated Gæaerrri mountains apparently do not. ETA continues to recruit heavily in this region, although probably at a somewhat slower pace than in the past.
Demonstration in Bilbao "against the dirty war" that Basque politicians allege Madrid is waging against ETA in southern France.

The massive floods of late August somewhat muted the political effervescence caused by the flag-burning incidents, but tensions rose again in the fall, this time as a result of ETA-PM actions. In October the poli-milis kidnapped and murdered Capt. Alberto Martin Barrios, of the Spanish Army's Pharmacy Brigade. The counterproductive nature of this action lends credence to the hypothesis that the current rash of ETA killings is prompted more by a desperate need to boost morale among the terrorists than by a coherent revolutionary strategy. Martin's membership in the Pharmacy Brigade made ETA's claim that it wanted to interrogate him concerning the government's antiterrorist program seem especially ludicrous. And the captor's image as a loving father, family man, and avid Basque ethnic evoked widespread sympathy for him within Euzkadi. His murder triggered an unparalleled outpouring of public hostility toward ETA. The largest Basque anti-ETA demonstration in memory—supported by all the parties save HB—was held in Bilbao. ETA-PM, however, was not cowed. It responded by abducting a prominent Basque businessman whose family—no doubt impressed by Martin's fate—paid more than $500,000 for his safe return. ETA-M then murdered several civil guards and alleged police informers. By the end of 1983, the number of deaths by terrorist violence had overtaken the previous year's total.

The Response in Madrid
The Socialist government took advantage of the uproar over the Martin killing to toughen its stance against terrorism. Gonzalez publicly renewed his vow never to negotiate with assassins, and he specifically dismissed the PNV's call for a "political solution" to the terrorist problem by affirming that only rigorous police measures could excise the ETA cancer. The government, however, did not stop at rhetoric, but pushed a series of special antiterrorist laws through Parliament, including:

- Stiffer punishment for terrorists and their collaborators.
- Provisions for closing down media entities that regularly lend moral support to terrorism.
- Authority to dissolve political parties whose members are convicted of terrorist crimes.
- Loosened restrictions on police searches and surveillance.
• Reductions in penalties for terrorists who collaborate with the authorities. These provisions do not mark a new phase in the government's antiterrorist program, but only legalize what has long been standard police practice.

There are indications, however, that Madrid is considering a fundamental shift in its anti-ETA strategy. According to the press, the government plans to send scores of unarmed plainclothes policemen into southern France to gather information regarding ETA. But whether the Spanish police will restrict their activities to intelligence gathering is open to question. Shortly after the Martin killing, French gendarmes detained four Spanish policemen for "scuffling" with an ETA-PM leader. We believe that the Spaniards intended to abduct the terrorist and return him to Spain. The incident, in our view, points up the danger that bungled operations in a "dirty war" against ETA could severely discredit the Gonzalez administration, which makes much of its devotion to democratic freedoms and legalities.

The government, however, appears determined to adopt an unorthodox strategy in dealing with ETA. Gonzalez has agreed to the formation of a group of mercenaries, controlled by the Army, to combat the terrorists outside the law. The mercenaries would not necessarily be Spaniards and that their mission would be to assassinate ETA leaders in Spain and France. A so-called Group for Antiterrorist Liberation (GAL), similar in nature to the strong-arm squads contemplated by the government, has in fact surfaced in southern France. GAL has murdered two well known ETA-M activists in southern France and kidnapped a Spanish businessman in Hendaye who was suspected of collaborating with the terrorists. Madrid has somewhat halfheartedly denied any knowledge of or connections to GAL, but Basque politicians, clearly convinced of the central government's complicity, have protested vociferously. The Spanish press is rife with speculation that the authorities are behind GAL, and the Gonzalez government has indicated that it is prepared to go to great lengths to extirpate ETA.

...and in Vitoria

More surprising than Madrid's tough response to the terrorists' offensive was the reaction in Vitoria, the Basque capital. The PNV, which controls the Basque Regional Government, has frequently been tepid in its public condemnations of ETA violence. This time, however, the party's top leaders outdid themselves in repudiating terrorism. The PNV helped organize the massive anti-ETA rally in Bilbao, and party president Arzallus highlighted the priority of the struggle against ETA at the PNV's annual "party day" celebration in October. These developments seem to be part of a general acceptance by the PNV leadership of the need to confront ETA openly.

Vitoria, in our view, has finally realized that ETA violence—not Madrid's "repression"—constitutes the greater danger to Spanish democracy and therefore to Basque autonomy.

In keeping with this new outlook, the PNV executive committee, according to the press, has ordered its local chapters to cease all collaboration with HB. The same sources report that the top party leaders have become convinced that the abertzale (Basque patriot) component of HB has been completely absorbed by the party's dominant Marxist-Leninist social revolutionary faction. With an eye toward the election of representatives to the regional parliament in March, the PNV hopes to attract new voters from the nonnationalist (but not anti-Basque) right, rather than from sympathizers of Herri Batasuna. While the PNV hierarchy may have written off the radical Basque separatists as allies, the party's rank and file is not so moderate. The average PNV voter remains much more sympathetic toward HB than toward Madrid-based parties. According to a poll of PNV supporters, 34 percent would back an alliance with HB and Euzkadiko Ezkerra (a small party once affiliated with ETA-PM), 21 percent would prefer a pact with HB alone, and a mere 6 percent would opt for an agreement with the nonnationalist right.

Clearly, the PNV's reorientation will have to progress slowly if the party is not to alienate its voters. HB remains a potent focus for ultranationalist sentiment in the Basque region: a week after the historic anti-
ETA rally in Bilbao the party sponsored a pro-ETA march that drew almost as many demonstrators. The PNV's fear of losing part of its nationalist following to HB continues, in our view, to temper the leadership's desire for closer cooperation with the central government and leads to frequent angry public exchanges between Madrid and Vitoria that further raise political tensions in the Basque region.

**Loss of a Golden Opportunity?**

We view the lack of full collaboration between the Basque and central governments as one of the chief stumbling blocks to effective police action against ETA. Madrid publicly asserts that the PNV and the Basque government refuse to share valuable intelligence with the national police. Basque politicians, according to US Embassy reporting, claim that Madrid fails to consult with them, violates the spirit of Basque autonomy by dealing with ETA on its own, and discounts the value of the public support the PNV could mobilize against the terrorists.

In the immediate aftermath of the Martin killing, however, it seemed that real cooperation between Madrid and Vitoria was about to begin. When the Socialist government first announced its plans for new antiterrorist legislation, PNV spokesman did not follow tradition by immediately condemning the project because it put police measures ahead of a "political solution" to the ETA problem. They did not exclude supporting the government's package if the PNV were allowed to participate in its formulation. Madrid, however, brushed aside these tentative offers and pushed the laws through Parliament without consulting the Basques. We believe that by so doing the Gonzalez administration sacrificed a golden opportunity to draw the Basque government into the struggle against ETA. This error has further strained relations between Madrid and Vitoria. The Basque government—understandably offended at being ignored while the central government consistently consults the rightwing Popular Alliance opposition—has demanded total control over antiterrorist operations in the region. This unrealistic and probably unconstitutional request has irritated Madrid and has added to the misunderstanding between the two governments.

**Outlook**

We believe that in the short term ETA will step up its attacks. Press reports indicate that ETA-M wants to pull off a spectacular action and may be gunning for Prime Minister Gonzalez himself. While we doubt that the terrorists have the infrastructure and logistical support to reach so well protected a target, they will probably be able to escalate the general level of violence. The various Spanish police forces are currently plagued by morale problems stemming from the influx of Socialist appointees, interservice rivalries, and mundane problems such as low pay. The police have made little progress combating ETA during the first year of Socialist rule. For example, only some 250 supposed terrorists have been detained this year (as compared to 520 in 1982), and less than half of these have been successfully prosecuted. Also, Madrid and Vitoria will remain at loggerheads at least until the Basque parliamentary elections are held in March. Only when the campaign is over and political passions have subsided is there a chance of significant cooperation between the central and Basque regional governments.

It is true that the long-run odds are not in ETA's favor. The slow but sure devolution of powers to the regional government will continue to reduce public support for terrorism in the Basque Country. Weariness with a never-ending struggle on the part of even the most dedicated separatists will almost certainly make recruitment more difficult and tempt many terrorists to retire. The coordinated opposition of Madrid and Vitoria to ETA—which we see as probable over the long term—will vastly increase the police pressure on the terrorists. These developments, however, may take years to come to full fruition. Until then, ETA will continue to kill military officers, industrialists, and civil guards. And it will retain the residual capacity to assassinate major political leaders—and thereby to jeopardize the stability of democratic institutions in Spain.
Page Denied
Statistical Overview

Type of Victim of International Terrorist Incidents, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>1983 Total</th>
<th>1982 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private parties, tourists</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category of International Terrorist Incidents, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>1983 Total</th>
<th>1982 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barricade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed attack</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijacking</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats, hoax</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>263</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniping</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>1983 Total</th>
<th>1982 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR/Eastern Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mideast and North Africa</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.
Chronology

This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology unless new information has been received.

29 December 1983

Turkey: Discovery of Suitcase Bomb
A bomb was discovered at Yesilkoy Airport on an Istanbul-Rome flight as the plane was loading. The bomb—1.5 kilograms of plastic explosive with a sophisticated delayed detonating device—was defused by the police. The bag containing the bomb had been checked through to New York aboard a Pan American flight from Rome, raising the possibility that the device was intended to go off after the bag was transferred to the Pan American flight. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the incident.

31 December 1983

West Germany: Bombings Claimed by Rote Zora
Simultaneous bombings at the Nixdorf computer firm in Hannover and a credit information bureau in Neuss were claimed by Rote Zora, the women's organization within the Revolutionary Cells. The group stated the attacks were to protest the massive collection and storage of computerized data relating to German citizens.

Late December 1983

West Germany: Bundeswehr Construction Site Firebombed
An explosion at an ammunition depot under construction caused minor damage. West German security officials have no leads in the case.

Early January 1984

Italy: Antonov Back to Prison
On 13 January, Rome's Court of Liberty ordered Sergei Antonov, the Bulgarian who is charged with complicity in the papal assassination attempt, transferred back to prison from house arrest. He has three days to appeal the ruling. Italian press has speculated that the action was taken to prevent Antonov from attempting to flee the country and to protect Antonov's life. A senior magistrate has told US Embassy officials that he believed Antonov would go to trial and would not be absolved.

25X1

Secret
GI TR 84-002
19 January 1984

25
Lebanon: Continued Attacks on French Interests
During the first two weeks of January, attacks on French interests in Beirut continued:
• On 1 January, the French Cultural Center in Tripoli was bombed.
• On 3 January, a French driver was killed with a silenced pistol while he was sitting in a French Embassy vehicle.
• On 12 January, an Egyptian official was fired at while riding in a car with French diplomatic plates. Four shots were discharged from a silenced revolver when a car pulled up alongside the one in which the official was riding—the official was unharmed.
• On 12 January, there was an RPG attack on the French Embassy in Beirut.
• On 13 January, the wife of the French Cultural Attache was slightly wounded when she was shot while riding in a car with French diplomatic plates.

1 January 1984
West Germany: Violent Demonstrations at Startbahn West
In Frankfurt, demonstrators hurled molotov cocktails and metal objects at police guarding the runway. West German security officials reported various acts of sabotage, and several police vehicles were damaged in the attacks. Startbahn West has been the site of numerous protest activities during the past two years, although anti-Startbahn demonstrations had diminished recently.

2 January 1984
Italy: Arson To Protest Italian Prison System
A group calling itself “Proletarians for Communism” claimed credit for burning the car of a student attending the school for prison guards in Portici, south of Naples. One bystander was killed in the resultant explosion.

2 January 1984
Italy: Arson To Protest Italian Prison System
A group calling itself “Proletarians for Communism” claimed credit for burning the car of a student attending the school for prison guards in Portici, south of Naples. One bystander was killed in the resultant explosion.

this group—an offshoot faction of
“Autonomia”—first surfaced in October 1983. Italian police authorities reportedly believe this act was meant to underscore the need for prison reform, as well as to signal retaliation for the cooperation of two “repentant” Red Brigades terrorists with Italian authorities.

3 January 1984
Turkey: Arrest of Terrorists
In Istanbul, security forces arrested 36 left-wing extremists believed to be members of the terrorist group Revolutionary Path (Dev Yol). The arrests followed police investigation of the 6 December robbery of a goldsmith’s shop in which the proprietor was killed. The group apparently was responsible for other robberies of goldsmith shops. We suspect the terrorists are committing robberies to obtain funds to finance their attempts to reorganize.
France: Attack by French Basques
In Anglet, the French Basque terrorist group Iparretarakan claimed credit for strafing a riot police station. No one was injured in the attack.

Spain: Bombings in Basque Country
In Lasarte, two bombs exploded outside banks, causing damage but no casualties. Although no group has claimed credit for the blasts, we believe a faction of the Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) was responsible. ETA has conducted similar attacks against financial institutions in its campaign to extort “revolutionary taxes.”

United States: Conviction in Slaying of Turkish Diplomat
In Los Angeles, a jury convicted Hampig Sassounian—an alleged member of the Armenian terrorist group Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide—of first degree murder in the 1982 ambush slaying of the Turkish Consul General. The jury finding of “special circumstances” in the killing—Sassounian lay in wait for the victim—could result in life imprisonment without parole or death in the gas chamber. Penalty deliberations were scheduled to begin 9 January.

Guadeloupe: Police Close Radio Station
Radio Ynite, apparently a center for Alliance Revolutionnaire Caraibe (ARC) activity, was raided and closed down by local authorities. ARC activists are believed responsible for a series of terrorist bombings on the island.

Guatemala: Guerrilla Safehouse Raided
Local press reported that authorities raided a guerrilla safehouse in Guatemala City, killing one guerrilla and capturing propaganda, grenades, ammunition, and materials used to make claymore mines.

West Germany: Bombing at South African Embassy
In Bonn, a molotov cocktail exploded in front of the Embassy, but there were no damages or injuries. West German police think it was the work of an individual, and not a terrorist organization.

Tunisia: Pipeline Sabotaged
A four-man commando team, entering Tunisia from Libya, used explosives to destroy a feeder pipeline from Algeria. The fire was finally brought under control when the Algerians stopped the oil flow. The Tunisian Foreign Ministry has sent a memorandum to Libyan authorities protesting the incident.
10 January 1984

Spain: Bombings in Basque Country
Suspected Basque guerrillas threw petrol bombs at two bank branches in San Sebastian and fired shots at two other banks in Basauri. These attacks resulted in damage but no casualties. Police also defused a bomb planted outside an industrial firm in Renteria. Although no group has claimed credit for these attacks, the Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) was probably responsible.

Corsica: Separatist Bombings Continue
In Ajaccio, nine bombs exploded during the night, destroying villas owned by French citizens. One man was killed and a second seriously injured in a premature explosion. Police believe the two men were attempting to plant the device at a villa when it exploded. Although no group claimed credit, we believe the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC) was responsible for the blasts—the latest in a long series of attacks over the past few years aimed at property owned by French.

France: Explosives Discovered on Madrid-Paris Train
A package containing 15 pounds of explosives—but not connected to a detonating device—was found aboard a Madrid-Paris train. Police have not yet determined when the explosives were put aboard the train nor who was responsible. Ten days earlier, two people were killed when a bomb exploded aboard a high-speed train traveling from Marseilles to Lyon. (The international terrorist known as Carlos sent a letter to the French Government claiming responsibility for the two attacks and for the bombing of the French Cultural Center in Tripoli, Lebanon.) Investigation is continuing to determine any links between these incidents.

11 January 1984

Zaire: Explosion at Kinshasa Airport
Luggage offloaded from an Aeroflot flight exploded in the baggage area of the Kinshasa airport, destroying virtually everything in the baggage room and shaking the main terminal and adjoining buildings. Zairian security forces have arrested the four Chadians who owned the luggage.

Spain: Basque Terrorist Bombs
In Bilbao, ETA/M claimed credit for a bomb attack on an office complex that caused serious property damage. No one was injured in the blast.
France: Arrest of French Basque Terrorists
In Bayonne, police arrested five members of the French Basque terrorist group Iparretarak as they were taking journalists to a clandestine news conference. Iparretarak claimed credit for several minor bombings in the French Basque region during the summer of 1983. Several Iparretarak members are being sought by French police for a terrorist attack in which three police officers were killed.

Portugal: Court Acquits BJO Member
Mohammed Hussein Rashid, a member of Abu Nidal’s Black June Organization on trial for the April 1983 murder of PLO official Issam Sartawi, was acquitted. Rashid told the court that he had not actually shot Sartawi but was acting as a decoy to draw attention away from the real killer, Youssef Al-Awad. Al-Awad was also captured by Portuguese authorities but has not yet been tried.

12 January 1984
Spain: Bombings Continue in Basque Country
In Villabona, the Military wing of ETA claimed credit for the bombing of a bank which caused damage but no injuries.

13 January 1984
Guatemala: Another Safehouse Raided
According to Reuters, soldiers backed by tanks and helicopters raided a guerrilla safehouse only two blocks from the Presidential Palace. Authorities reported three guerrillas were killed in the attack and two members of the security force were wounded.

France: Bank Bombings in French Basque Country
In Aix-en-Provence, bombs exploded outside three banks during the night, causing damage but no injuries. No group has yet claimed credit for the attacks. French Basques may be copying Spanish Basque terrorists who frequently bomb banks in attempts to extort “revolutionary taxes.”

15 January 1984
Argentina: Bomb Thrown at Vatican Embassy
A firebomb was thrown at the Papal Nunciature in Buenos Aires, apparently in protest against an agreement mediated by the Pope for Argentina and Chile to begin negotiations to resolve their territorial dispute over the Beagle Channel. Neither injuries nor major damage occurred; no group has claimed responsibility.

16 January 1984
Lebanon: End of Investigation Into Meloy Assassination
The GOL investigation into the 1976 assassinations of US Ambassador Meloy and two of his companions in Beirut ended today after a bill of indictment was published calling for the death penalty for one assassin and life imprisonment for the other two. All three assassins were members of the PFLP and were sentenced in absentia—one has never been apprehended, and the other two were released on their own recognizance several weeks ago.
17 January 1984

Lebanon: Saudi Diplomat Kidnapped

Lebanese security reports a senior Saudi diplomat was kidnapped in Beirut and one of his aides was shot.
Page Denied